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Protection of Mutual Interests?
Employment Protection and Skill Formation
in Different Labour Market Regimes
ABSTRACT ■  The ‘varieties of capitalism’ school argues that firm-specific
skills are more common in coordinated than in liberal economies and that
appropriate training is facilitated by employment protection legislation. We
compare the level of firm-specific skills across 21 countries with different
capacities for labour market coordination. The data provide very limited 
support for the thesis, showing large variation among the coordinated 
countries. The results indicate ‘varieties of coordination’, which have different
implications for the incidence and consequences of firm-specific skill.
Improved operationalization of the skill concept seems urgent.
KEYWORDS: coordination ■ employment protection ■ firm-specific skill ■
labour market flexibility ■ on-the-job training ■ trade unions
Introduction
According to standard neoclassical economics, employment protection
regulation is a source of labour market rigidity, since it reduces the ability
of firms to hire and fire at will. This is considered especially problematic at
a time when firms must adapt quickly and flexibly to unpredictable, glob-
al markets. This view has been challenged by the ‘varieties of capitalism’
(VoC) school, which denies that a liberal, unregulated labour market is a
prerequisite for economic success. In coordinated economies, employment
protection may benefit both employers and the national economy, as pro-
duction strategies require a workforce with firm-specific skills.
This article analyses one foundation of VoC theory: the assumed
cross-national variation in skill profiles and the association between
firm-specific skills and levels of employment protection. The overarch-
ing aim is to broaden the discussion of the relationship between regula-
tion and labour market dynamics.
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Although numerous empirical studies have been devoted to this sub-
ject, the link between employment protection legislation and rigidity
has not been firmly established, as results seem to be dependent on the
measures of rigidity used. However, many (though far from all)
researchers agree that strict employment protection reduces unemployment
inflows and outflows (protecting regular employees, but creating entry
problems for groups with a weak labour market affiliation) (OECD, 2004).
The inconsistent empirical findings seem less surprising than the con-
sistency in theoretical approach. As the OECD (2004: 89) points out,
‘most analyses of employment protection have been conducted within a
framework that does not justify its existence’. By regarding employment
protection solely as a cost for employers, researchers may have been
blind to its beneficial effects (Blank and Freeman, 1994). In fact, it can be
argued that employment security enhances productivity by encouraging
employees to invest in human capital, especially firm-specific human
capital. Since firm-specific skill is valuable at only one firm, employees
can be expected to under-invest in such skill if there is no employment
protection legislation that guarantees long-term employment relation-
ships (Belot et al., 2002).
VoC scholars insist that globalization does not call for the elimination
of social protection, as is often claimed; cross-national differences in leg-
islation are predicted to persist. However, the novelty of the approach is
not this prediction, which is in line with corporatist theory, but the dis-
cussion of the motives for maintaining social protection. While corpo-
ratist theory points to the importance of the power resources of various
social actors, notably trade unions, VoC scholars emphasize that such
regulation exists because it provides a comparative advantage to certain
employers (Hall, 1999; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Soskice, 1999).
The basic thesis is that the institutional framework of a country –
defined by its capacity for non-market ‘coordination’, or long-term 
strategic interaction between companies and the state, financial institu-
tions and trade unions – determines their production strategies and, con-
sequently, their demand for various skills. In coordinated market
economies (CMEs), firms tend to undertake high-quality niche market
production or diversified mass production; and the focus on quality and
frequent product changes requires a workforce with a profound knowl-
edge of the specific firm or industry, who can work autonomously, per-
form a wide range of tasks and continuously detect and solve production
problems. In liberal market economies (LMEs), the lack of coordination
forces firms to react promptly to market supply and demand signals and,
deriving advantage from their capacity for fast and radical change, they 
opt for either standardized, low-wage production or radical product inno-
vation in new industries such as software production and biotechnology –
strategies that require mainly general skills, readily available on the market
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(Estévez-Abe et al., 2001; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Soskice, 1999; Thelen,
2001).
In sum, VoC scholars claim that the need for specific skills makes long-
term contracts important to companies in CMEs. Without some promise
of stable employment, employees are reluctant to invest in cultivating
such skill, since it is of little value on the open market and since the accu-
mulation of firm-specific skill tends to reduce their general, marketable
skills. In contrast, the ability to hire and fire in LMEs is more important
to firms and less of a problem for employees, who do possess general,
marketable skills.
Previous Research and Our Contribution
Previously, the idea that production strategies are formed by a country’s
capacity for coordination has been explored mainly in case studies
(Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997; Soskice, 1999). Recently, however,
Soskice and colleagues set out to test ‘the key to the argument’ above,
namely the link between skill and social protection, using quantitative data
from several countries (Estévez-Abe et al., 2001). While this is a welcome
development, the empirical analysis has several shortcomings. First, their
main measure of firm-specific skill, average tenure rates, is problematic, as
we show below. Second, the descriptive and highly aggregated level of
analysis makes it difficult to identify the relevant patterns in the mosaic of
data. Third, since none of the individual factors likely to affect tenure, such
as age, gender, and class are considered in the analysis, the comparison can
be misleading. Taken together, these problems make it difficult to judge the
empirical validity of the conclusions.
Our aim in this article is to provide a more sophisticated test of the the-
oretical arguments presented above by using a large set of individual data
from several countries and applying a multi-level modelling technique,
which allows us to control for both macro- and micro-level factors
simultaneously. Also, we believe that the theoretical concepts of skill and
coordination deserve further attention.
Skill Specificity: Concept and Measurement
The concept of skill specificity was originally developed in Becker’s
human capital theory. Becker distinguished between general skills, which
are of equal value in many different companies and specific skills, which
are useful at only one firm. Because of the risk of poaching, firms have no
incentive to provide their employees with general skills. They will, how-
ever, invest in specific skills and in order to protect these investments will
attempt to retain employees with such skills. Because workers with spe-
cific skills also have less incentive to quit, on-the-job learning and train-
ing cause workers and their employers to ‘get bonded together’ (Becker,
1993: 20). Therefore, skill investments may explain why employment in
advanced industrial countries tends to be long-term (Osterman, 1984).
In more recent research, some of Becker’s ideas have been contested
with findings showing that many skills are in fact transferable, that is,
valuable at various, though not at all, firms, and that employers invest in
these skills also (OECD, 2004).1 Still, the distinction between general and
specific skill remains central to the economic literature on training
(Leuven, 2005).
In the VoC perspective, this division is seen as a constitutive feature of
production regimes. Hall and Soskice (2001) argue that in LMEs, firms
and other actors invest mainly in switchable assets (that is, assets whose
value can be realized if diverted to other purposes), while in CMEs,
actors are more willing to invest in specific assets, that cannot readily
be turned into another purpose, and co-specific assets, whose return
depends on the cooperation of others. The prime example is the assumed
difference in skill formation and its implications for social protection
(Estévez-Abe et al., 2001): firm-specific skills should be associated with
stronger employment protection. Interestingly, however, these authors
also discuss industry-specific skills – a ‘co-specific asset’ characteristic 
of CMEs – and suggest that such skills should have somewhat different
policy implications. Since workers possessing such skills can move
between firms within a specific trade or industry without loss of income,
employment protection per se should matter less. Investment in industry-
specific skills instead depends on the availability of unemployment
benefits that enable workers to turn down job offers outside the trade for
which they were trained, and on coordinated wage bargaining systems
that reduce the risk that income might drop radically. Empirically, they
do not make much of this distinction. However, we will return to the
argument later, when discussing the association between institutions and
the ‘portability’ of skills.
Since skills are not readily observable, they are difficult to measure, and
consequently theoretical discussions of skill specificity have not been
underpinned by thorough empirical analysis. Soskice and colleagues use
average tenure to measure firm-specific skill. However, since tenure rates
are likely to reflect the costs of dismissing workers as a result of employ-
ment protection, this indicator is problematic. When they argue that since
most job switching is voluntary, ‘at least part of the effect of employment
protection on tenure must go through the effect of the former on the stock
of firm-specific skills’ (Estévez-Abe et al., 2001: 171), they also blur the
distinction between these factors. We believe that it is important to uphold
a firm distinction between the concept and indicators of skill specificity
European Journal of Industrial Relations 14(3)
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since it is not established how different indicators of skill specificity are
associated with each other.2
In this article, our main measure of skill specificity is on-the-job train-
ing. This measure captures the amount of training that is required to per-
form a job. On-the-job training has been associated with skill specificity
and long-term employment in both human capital and internal labour
market theories (Becker, 1993; Osterman, 1984) and represents a more
direct measure of skill specificity than tenure. Another measure of skill
specificity has been developed by Iversen and Soskice (2001). This com-
pares the major ISCO-88 occupational groups regarding the number of
occupational categories (unit groups) included, as well as their share of
the labour force. While this measure identifies small and specialized
occupational groups, it seems less relevant to the theoretical discussions
of firm-specific skill and its implications. In fact, employees with this
kind of specialized knowledge are likely to be moveable between
employers within a trade or industry.
The on-the-job training measure is supplemented and compared with
two other, more indirect, indicators of specific skill investment. One is a
measure of mutual employer–employee dependence. This is included
because the VoC argument linking specific skill to employment protec-
tion rests firmly on the idea that ‘firms and individuals investing heavily
in [firm-specific] skills become increasingly dependent on one another’
(Estévez-Abe et al., 2001: 169). In fact, this is a basic assumption both in
human capital and internal labour markets theories (Becker, 1993;
Osterman, 1984).
The other measure is average tenure. This is included partly for the
sake of comparison with previous research and partly because tenure,
like mutual employer–employee dependence, is an assumed consequence
of investment in firm-specific skills. While our measure of on-the-job
training cannot discriminate between firm- and industry-specific skill,
tenure and employer–employee dependence could indicate to what
extent employees perceive that their skills can be used in different firms.
Thus, while on-the-job training, tenure and employer–employee depend-
ence represent three different attempts at measuring specific skill, they may
also, taken together, deepen our understanding of how labour market insti-
tutions affect the ‘portability’ of skills. Here, we use them to scrutinize the
association between coordination and skill suggested in the VoC literature,
but also to discuss a more differentiated concept of coordination.
The Concept of Coordination
The theoretical concept of coordination refers to a set of institutional
devices that enable firms to engage in long-term strategic interaction with
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each other and with other important actors, instead of basing their deci-
sions solely on market supply and demand signals. These institutions
underpin credible commitments by providing for the exchange of infor-
mation, the monitoring of actors’ behaviour and the sanctioning of non-
cooperation. However, Hall and Soskice (2001: 11) also emphasize the
importance of deliberative institutions, which encourage actors to engage
in collective discussion and reach agreements. Deliberative proceedings
‘thicken the common knowledge’ and ‘improve the confidence’ in the
strategies applied by other actors. This is especially important when
actors are faced with new, unfamiliar challenges.
Thus it can be argued that deliberative institutions are intrinsically dif-
ferent from monitoring and sanctioning institutions, and we believe that
the presence and efficiency of deliberative institutions can affect the
‘portability’ of skills acquired through practical training. In the labour
market, the most conspicuous deliberative institution is collective bar-
gaining and we believe there is a difference between countries where
employment protection has been unilaterally imposed by the state
through legislation and those where regulation is established through
collective bargaining. Where employment protection is negotiable,
unions may strive for ‘long-term’ employment security by strengthening
the employability of their members. As a general strategy, they may push
for life-long learning policies and in the case of lay-offs, call for replace-
ment jobs and re-training opportunities. Thus, skill investments become
an issue of negotiation. Presumably therefore, skills should be more
portable when unions are strong and collective bargaining important.
Following this reasoning, we will divide the CMEs into a Nordic and
a Continental regime. The division is based on the assumption that delib-
erative institutions play a larger role in the former and that this may
affect skill formation.3 Average union density in the Nordic countries is
over 70 percent of the workforce; more than double that in Continental
countries, where density is no higher than in LMEs (OECD, 2004). In
the Nordic countries, the collective agreement is the prime form of reg-
ulation and when there is legislation, it focuses on union rights and pro-
cedures while the rules are largely elastic and can be changed in collective
agreements (Bruun et al., 1990). Thus, trade unions play an important
role at the national level, but also in individual companies, where they are
involved in co-determining production issues. In recent years, these local
unions have increased their influence over both wage and non-wage
issues. Presumably, this Nordic type of coordination – based on the fre-
quent re-negotiation of terms, at several, interconnected levels – allows
for both long-term strategic action and for the rapid change characteris-
tic of LMEs.
By contrast, coordination in Continental countries seems less flexible.
Although collective agreements are part of labour market regulation,
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they appear for several reasons to be less ‘negotiable’ than in the Nordic
countries. First, there is a tradition of legislated individual rights, which
limits the scope for negotiations (Bruun et al., 1990; Rönnmar, 2004).
Second, sectoral agreements provide little room for adjustment to the
needs of different enterprises. Also, local adaptations are complicated
by the fact that co-determination and negotiations in the companies
are handled by the work council and not by local unions (Rönnmar, 
2004; Wallerstein et al., 1997). Third, there is a huge discrepancy between
the low trade union density and the extensive coverage of collective
agreements. To some extent, this is the result of employers extending col-
lective bargaining provisions to cover non-unionized workers. However,
there are also administrative ‘extension’ mechanisms, which can make
collective agreements binding on employers who are not among the sig-
natory parties (OECD, 2004).
In the analysis, we also include a group of Mediterranean countries.
These have not been thoroughly analysed in the VoC literature, according
to which they cannot be readily classified as either coordinated or liberal;
yet they share some features that make it possible to regard them as a
group (Hall and Soskice, 2001). A distinguishing feature relevant to this
analysis is the very active role played by the state and the weak and rather
militant unions (Molina Romo, 2006; Schmidt, 2003). Because of these
characteristics, coordination in the Mediterranean countries is achieved
through national legislation, rather than through agreements between
labour and management. This absence of deliberative institutions clearly
sets them apart from the Nordic countries, while they are similar to the
Continental countries in terms of the low level of union membership and
the use of extension mechanisms (OECD, 2004).
Our analysis of skill differences also includes some ‘transition
economies’. Most of these appear to be liberal, with low tax levels and
small public sectors. Similarly, union density is relatively low and most
bargaining is carried out at company level. However, the low GDP per
capita, as well as the relatively rigid business regulation, clearly set them
apart from Western LMEs (Knell and Srholec, 2006). Consequently, to
classify them into a specific regime type within the VoC framework
is difficult (Buchen, 2006). Therefore, the purpose of including them is
mainly exploratory.
Aim and Hypotheses
The objective of this article is to test the VoC thesis that firm-specific
skills are more common in CMEs than in LMEs and that the need for
such skills is reflected in the level of employment protection. However,
we will also test the idea that there are differences among CMEs.
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Hypothesis 1. Firm-specific skills are more common in Continental than in
Liberal economies. The Nordic countries are expected to occupy an inter-
mediate position, since their coordination is more flexible, allowing a larger
spectrum of production strategies. The Mediterranean countries, where
coordination is achieved through state activity rather than through delibera-
tive institutions, are expected to be similar to the Continental countries.
Hypothesis 2a. Countries with stricter employment protection legislation
have more firm-specific skills.
Hypothesis 2b. Because powerful unions can reduce employees’ depend-
ence on a single employer, both tenure and mutual employer–employee
dependence should be lower in countries with higher trade union density.
Data and Variables
The individual-level data used in the article come from the 2004 European
Social Survey, which covers representative samples of the adult popula-
tions in 21 countries.4 In this article, a weighted sub-sample comprising
employees only is used (n  17,056). Three different measures of firm-
specific skill are used as dependent variables.
[Y1] Required on-the-job training is the respondents’ estimate of how
long it would take for somebody with the right education and training
to learn to do their job reasonably well (responses coded into three cate-
gories: 0–4 weeks  0; one month to one year  50; more than one
year  100).
[Y2] Average tenure is the number of years the respondent has been
with his or her employer (0–70 years).
[Y3] Mutual employer–employee dependence is measured by respons-
es, on scales ranging from zero to ten, to the questions how difficult it
would be a) ‘for you to get a similar or better job with another employ-
er if you wanted to’, and b) ‘for your employer to replace you if you left’.
The relationship between these two indicators was analysed using latent
class analysis. Different models of varying complexity were tested against
the data. The model best representing the data consist of five clusters,
each capturing a distinct employer–employee relationship. Two clusters
reflect situations of high and medium mutual employer–employee
dependence, where employees are both difficult to replace and would
have difficulties finding an equal or better job. These clusters were com-
bined into a single measure applying a weight reflecting the different
indicator probabilities for cluster membership in the medium- and high-
dependence category. Variable values range between 0 and 100 to indicate
cluster membership probabilities in percentages.
As mentioned above, mutual dependence can be seen as an indirect
measure of skill specificity. However, to get an accurate picture of
European Journal of Industrial Relations 14(3)
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dependence relations in the different regimes, the other clusters will also
be examined. These capture a worker–power situation (the employee is
difficult to replace but has no problem finding an equal or better job else-
where), an employer–power situation (the opposite situation), and an
independence situation (the employee is easy to replace but can easily
find a new job with another employer).
It is legitimate to raise concern whether these subjective perceptions
capture the real nature of employment relations. Using Swedish data,
validity tests of the relationships between these measures and data on
wages and job mobility suggest that they are valid indicators of power
relations between employees and their employers.5 We will refer to these
other forms of dependence in the empirical section, but for reasons of
space will not provide tables. However, these are available from the
authors on request.
Three different contextual variables are used in the analysis. The key
variable for testing h1 is labour market regime [X]. This variable distin-
guishes five country groupings, each assumed to capture a more or less
distinct labour market regime. The Liberal economies are represented by
Ireland and the UK, while the coordinated countries have been divided
into a Nordic group (Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway) and a
Continental group (Austria, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium and the
Netherlands). Also included are a Mediterranean group (France, Spain,
Portugal, and Greece) and a Transitional group (Hungary, the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Slovenia and Estonia).
To test h2a we use the OECD index of the overall strictness of employ-
ment protection legislation [Z], which is composed of 18 items covering
three main areas: employment protection of regular workers against indi-
vidual dismissal; specific requirements for collective dismissal; regulation
of temporary forms of employment. The index originally varied between
0–6 but has been standardized to vary between 0–100. For h2b we use
trade union density [W], which is the percentage of employees in each
country that are members of a trade union (OECD, 2004).
The analysis also includes some individual-level control variables: [A]
gender, [B] class,6 [C] workplace size and [D] age. Workplace size has
proved important for both long-term employment and on-the-job training
(OECD, 2003; Osterman, 1984), and earlier studies of tenure and training
indicate that service class employees may have more firm-specific skills than
manual workers (OECD, 1993, 2003). Regarding gender, it has been argued
that women may be less inclined to invest in developing firm-specific skills,
because of the likelihood of career interruption (Estévez-Abe et al., 2001).
Age has an obvious association with tenure. Apart from controlling for
potential compositional effects, we are also interested in whether gender,
class and age differences in skill acquisition vary systematically between
labour market regimes.
Edlund & Grönlund: Protection of Mutual Interests? 
253
Results
Different Regimes, Different Skills?
Because the variables of interest are measured at different levels, multi-
level analysis (MLA) is used. Since it can be argued that country charac-
teristics are contextual variables (individuals in one country have more
similarity with each other than with individuals in other countries) this
method is more appropriate than OLS regression, which assumes obser-
vations to be independent (Hox, 2002).
The first part of the analysis examines the influence of labour market
regime on each of the indicators of firm-specific skill, including interac-
tions between labour market regime and gender, class, workplace size,
and age. Written in the language of hierarchical logit notation,7 the base-
line model can be notated as: {Y*X*A, Y*X*B, Y*X*C, Y*X*D}.
After running a series of regressions in which we systematically analysed
the variance of individual-level effects across countries, and, based on
these findings, introduced and deleted specific interaction terms, we
arrived at the following models as the best representations of the data:
On-the-job training {Y1*X*D, Y1*A, Y1*B, Y1*C}
Tenure {Y2*X*A, Y2*X*B, Y2*X*C, Y2*X*D}
Mutual employer–employee dependence {Y3*X, Y3*A, Y3*B, Y3*C, Y3*D}
The most complex patterns pertain to tenure, involving significant inter-
action effects between each of the individual-level variables and the
regime variable. The other two models are comparatively less complex.
In order to interpret the results from the MLA properly, both the main
and the interaction effects must be considered simultaneously, a difficul-
ty that increases with model complexity. Therefore, for tenure, the results
from the regression model above are presented in the form of predicted
values (Table 1).8 The original regression outputs from the two simpler
models are shown in Table 2. We report the unstandardized regression
coefficient (b) and the associated test of significance (t). By convention, a
t-value outside the ±1.96 interval indicates that the b differs significantly
from zero. To exemplify, in Table 2, it is shown that the probability for a
mutual dependence relationship is 11.37 percent units higher in the
Continental regime compared to the Liberal regime. A t-value of 3.66
indicates that the difference between the Continental and the Liberal
regimes is significant. In contrast, the b for the Nordic regime (2.80) and
the t (0.73) indicate that the observed difference between the Nordic and
the Liberal regimes is rather small and not significant.
Hypothesis 1 suggests that the amount of firm-specific skill is higher in
the Continental labour market regime, than in the Liberal, with the
Nordic regime occupying an intermediate position. As shown in Table 1,
for tenure the main dividing line runs between the Liberal regime, having
European Journal of Industrial Relations 14(3)
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TABLE 1. Firm-specific Skill (Tenure [Y2]) by Labour Market Regime [X],
Gender [A], Class [B], Workplace Size [C], and Age [D]a
Regime Nordic Continental Mediterranean Transitional Liberal
Mean 11.4 11.6 10.9 10.3 9.0
Gender
Men 11.4 12.6 11.4 9.7 10.0
Women 11.5 10.4 10.3 10.9 8.1
Class
Service class I 11.0 12.0 12.4 11.4 10.3
Service class II 12.1 13.1 12.4 11.8 10.5
Routine 
non-manuals 11.4 10.8 10.4 9.8 7.6
Skilled workers 10.9 11.7 12.3 10.1 7.9
Unskilled workers 11.2 10.0 9.0 9.3 8.6
Workplace size
25 10.2 10.3 9.3 8.6 8.2
500 13.5 13.8 15.4 13.7 9.4
Age
20–30 2.6 3.2 3.2 3.9 3.4
40–50 12.1 13.2 13.6 11.9 10.4
55–65 19.1 20.3 20.5 17.0 15.6
Term F P Term F p
Y2*X 3.721 .021 Y2*X*A 6.244 .002
Y2*A 11.242 .003 Y2*X*B 2.704 .002
Y2*B 15.564 .000 Y2*X*C 4.940 .006
Y2*C 189.801 .000 Y2*X*D 3.822 .020
Y2*D 870.958 .000
a Estimates are predicted values derived from a multi-level regression model specified
as: {Y2*X*A, Y2*X*B, Y2*X*C, Y2*X*D} n  16,167.
the lowest tenure, and the coordinated regimes of Continental and Northern
Europe, where average tenure is approximately 2.5 years longer. The low
level of firm-specific skill in the Liberal regime is also reflected in the
mutual dependence measure (Table 2). Here, the highest level is found in
the Continental and Transitional regimes, while the level of dependence
in the Nordic regime is close to that of the Liberal regime.
Regarding on-the-job training, the main and interaction effects of age
and regime indicate that differences in training among the young are
quite small across regimes. However, among older employees, on-the-
job training is greater in the Nordic regime than in the Continental and
Liberal regimes.9 In the Mediterranean countries we can observe a low
level of on-the-job training. As in the Continental countries, they have a
high level of mutual dependence, while tenure is slightly lower compared
to the Continental and Nordic countries.
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TABLE 2. Firm-specific Skill (On-the-job Training [Y1], Mutual Dependence
[Y3]) by Labour Market Regime [X], Gender [A], Class [B], Workplace Size
[C], and Age [D]a
On-the-job training Mutual dependence 
b t b t
Intercept 13.87 3.73 1.26 0.39
Regime
Nordic 10.18 2.31 2.80 0.73
Continental 5.86 1.38 11.37 3.10
Mediterranean 6.66 1.45 8.75 2.28
Transitional 2.00 0.47 13.25 3.66
Liberal 0 0
Gender
Men 10.60 11.53 2.78 4.15
Women 0 0
Class
Service class I 30.76 18.10 7.04 6.78
Service class II 25.91 16.05 4.09 4.43
Routine non-manuals 15.10 9.35 2.40 2.58
Skilled workers 19.02 11.47 3.15 3.18
Unskilled workers 0 0
Workplace size 1.87 7.39 0.75 3.21
Age 0.14 1.62 0.20 6.62
Regime*Age
Nordic*Age 0.30 2.73
Continental*Age 0.11 1.02
Mediterranean*Age 0.04 0.36
Transitional*Age 0.01 0.11
Liberal*Age 0
n 15,944 15,724
a Estimates are unstandardized regression coefficients from multi-level regression mod-
els specified as: {Y1*X*D, Y1*A, Y1*B, Y1*C} and {Y3*X, Y3*A, Y3*B, Y3*C, Y3*D}.
Shifting the focus to the individual-level variables, we note that men
tend to have more firm-specific skills than women. This fits well with
previous research and is particularly evident for on-the-job training. The
results also show, again in line with previous research, that the service
classes display higher levels of firm-specific skill than do workers and
routine non-manuals. Also the positive relationship between age and
firm-specific skill is as expected. Regarding workplace size, we find that
tenure is longer and on-the-job training more frequent in large organiza-
tions than in small ones; however, mutual dependence is most common
in small workplaces.
Generally, the effects of the individual-level variables are similar across
regimes. The main exception is tenure. Here, the Nordic regime is dis-
tinctive in having negligible gender and class differences in tenure.
However, the effect of age on tenure – and especially on training – seems
particularly strong in the Nordic regime. The effect of workplace size on
tenure is less emphasized in the Liberal regime and most salient in the
Mediterranean regime.
In sum, our hypothesis that firm-specific skill is more common in the
Continental than the Liberal regime is confirmed when the measures of
mutual employer–employee dependence and tenure are used. The predict-
ed intermediate position of the Nordic regime is manifested mainly in the
level of mutual dependence, which is close to that of the Liberal regime; in
tenure rates, however, the Nordic regime does not differ from the
Continental. When it comes to on-the-job training, the results do not sup-
port the hypothesis since the incidence of training in the Liberal regime is
not particularly low compared to the other regimes, except the Nordic.
The Mediterranean countries stand out with a low level of on-the-job
training. This may indicate that standardized, Fordist production strategies
are more important here than in both liberal and coordinated countries.
In VoC theory, firm-specific skill is associated with mutual
employer–employee dependence while general skill is associated with
independence, or pure market relationships. However, as pointed out
above, the latent class analysis that generated our measure of mutual
dependence also identified other, asymmetric (employer–power and work-
er–power) relationships. Using multi-level regressions testing the associa-
tion between labour market regimes and these dependence measures, we
find that in the Nordic and Liberal regimes, worker–power and independ-
ence relationships are the most common, while in the remaining regimes,
employer–power and mutual dependence relationships are the most fre-
quent. This reinforces our earlier observation regarding mutual depend-
ence and our conclusion is that although employees in the Liberal and,
especially, the Nordic countries accumulate considerable specific skill – as
measured by tenure and training – they are less dependent on their employ-
ers than their counterparts are in the Continental and Mediterranean
regimes.
Finally, we will report the results for the Transitional regime, for which
no explicit hypotheses were formulated. The high level of mutual
dependence makes these countries more similar to the Continental than
to the Liberal regime, while in terms of tenure, they occupy an interme-
diate position. However, it should be noted that tenure rates in the
Transitional countries are likely to be affected by the recent turbulence in
the labour market. This may also explain the moderate impact of age on
tenure and the fact that women have longer average tenure than men:
many women may have left the labour market altogether.
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Skill Needs and Social Protection
The next step of our analysis is to examine the link between social protec-
tion and firm-specific skill. Our main expectation is that firm-specific skill
is more common in countries with stricter employment protection legisla-
tion than in countries offering little employment protection. However, we
also explore the role of union density. Here, we assume that in countries
where density is high, unions have the power to influence skill investments
in a way that ensures the long-term employability of their members.
Consequently, employees in these countries should be less dependent on a
single employer, as reflected in measures of tenure and dependence. Data on
employment protection and union density are reported at the foot of Table 3.
The transitional countries have been omitted because of missing data.
Hypothesis 2a states that employees in countries with stricter employ-
ment protection legislation have more firm-specific skills. As shown in
Table 3, the results are not entirely straightforward. As expected, stricter
employment protection is associated with more mutual employer–employee
dependence. Contrary to our hypothesis, however, we find that employ-
ment protection is negatively associated with on-the-job training. This
may be explained by the fact that the Mediterranean countries score com-
paratively low on training while having the strictest employment protec-
tion legislation. In the case of tenure, the effect of employment protection
is negative but not significant.
In accordance with hypothesis 2b, it is shown that high union density
tends to reduce mutual employer–employee dependence. Regressions using
the other dependency measures further support the hypothesis. These
show that union density is positively correlated with worker–power and
independence relationships, and negatively associated with employer–power
relationships. Interestingly, employment protection has the opposite (nega-
tive) effect on worker–power and independence relationships. Thus, when
using direct measures of dependence, we find that strong unions can make
employees less dependent on a single employer, while stricter employment
protection is associated with a stronger dependence on the employer.
Conclusions
This article analyses one foundation of VoC theory: the assumed cross-
national variation in skill profiles. The findings identify both empirical
and theoretical issues worth considering in future research about labour
market regimes, skills and employment protection legislation.
First, the results suggest that there are not only varieties of capitalism,
but also varieties of coordination, with different implications for skill
formation, employment security and labour market dynamics. Second,
our findings highlight the need to discuss the concept of skill specificity
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and to improve the operationalization of skill. In this final section we dis-
cuss these points and formulate some tentative conclusions concerning
skill, coordination and labour market flexibility.
The analysis provides only weak support for the VoC thesis. To some
extent, the proposed association between firm-specific skill, coordination
and employment protection is confirmed for the countries of continental
Europe, which display high levels of on-the-job training, tenure and
mutual employer–employee dependence and also have fairly strict employ-
ment protection legislation. Also, an important finding is the existence of
substantial differences among CMEs, with the Nordic countries similar
in many respects to the LMEs.
In the study from which our main hypotheses have been extracted,
Soskice and colleagues argue – against the literature that regards employ-
ment and income protection as successful trade union attempts to reduce
worker dependence on the market and employers – that employment
protection is an effort to ‘increase workers’ dependence on particular
employers’ that ‘stems from the strength rather than the weakness of
employers’ (Estévez-Abe et al., 2001: 180). However, our findings chal-
lenge this argument, regarding both ‘strength’ and ‘dependence’. The
results suggest that organized labour plays a crucial role in determining
the nature of coordination, as we illustrate by comparing the polarized
patterns observed in the Mediterranean and the Nordic regimes.
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TABLE 3. Firm-specific Skill (On-the-job Training [Y1], Tenure [Y2], Mutual
Dependence [Y3]) by Employment Protection [Z], Union Density [W], Gender
[A], Class [B], Workplace Size [C], and Age [D]. Selected Outputa
On-the-job training Tenure Mutual dependence
b t b t b t
Intercept 17.02 3.20 8.11 3.29 3.77 0.88
Employment protection 0.23 2.06 0.10 1.90 0.20 2.25
Trade union density 0.05 1.00 0.04 1.55 0.10 2.34
(n) 12,143 12,335 12,044
i) Employment protection (0–100): Nordic regime 38 (Sweden 43, Norway 43,
Finland 35, Denmark 30), Continental regime 37 (Austria 37, Germany 42, Belgium
42, Netherlands 38, Switzerland 27), Mediterranean regime 52 (France 48, Greece 48,
Spain 52, Portugal 58), Liberal regime 20 (Ireland 22, UK 18).
ii) Trade union density (0–100): Nordic regime 71 (Sweden 79, Norway 54, Finland
76, Denmark 74), Continental regime 32 (Austria 37, Germany 25, Belgium 56,
Netherlands 23, Switzerland 18), Mediterranean regime 19 (France 10, Greece 27,
Spain 15, Portugal 24), Liberal regime 35 (Ireland 38, UK 31).
Source: OECD (2004).
a Estimates are unstandardized regression coefficients from multi-level regression
models specified as: {Y*Z, Y*W, Y*A, Y*B, Y*C, Y*D}.
Regarding strength, we should distinguish between employer strength
per se and the power balance between employers and workers. In coun-
tries where trade union density is low, employers are strong relative to
workers, who are forced to compete for jobs by underbidding each other
in their demands for wages and decent work conditions. In the absence
of unions, workers can only be protected by legislation of a rather rigid
kind, for example, regarding minimum wages and non-negotiable
employment protection (Harcourt and Wood, 2007; Kamiat, 1996).
Therefore, it is not surprising that the Mediterranean countries have the
highest score on the OECD index of employment protection legislation
while trade union density is the lowest in Europe. This suggests that
employment protection legislation may reflect union weakness and (rel-
ative) employer strength, but not coordination in the sense understood
by the VoC approach. According to the logic of this school, a more rele-
vant definition of strength would be the capacity for collective action,
that is, organization, and employer organization is very much a result of
worker organization. Considering membership figures of employer asso-
ciations, employers in the Nordic countries are very strong indeed – as
are trade unions.
Also, union strength appears to be connected to union strategy. For a
long time, the Nordic unions have pushed strategies of ‘co-determination’
(Korpi, 1983; Siaroff, 1999). At the micro-level, they have collaborated
with management in designing the work process, encouraging job flexi-
bility and skill enhancement (Dobbin and Boychuk, 1999). At the macro-
level, they have embraced structural rationalization and new technologies,
seeking employment security in the long-term viability of the economy.
Also, these strong unions generally seek to avoid rigid legislation, fighting
for their right to negotiate. In short, strong unions are instrumental to the
creation of deliberative institutions.
This brings us to the issue of dependence. Here, Northern Europe
stands out from the other coordinated countries: the average employee
works more than 11 years for the same employer. Such long-term
attachments create good opportunities for the development of firm-
specific skills, which is reflected in the amount of on-the-job training.
Still, Nordic employees are not dependent on their employer to the same
extent as employees in Continental and Mediterranean countries. A rea-
son may be the importance of deliberative institutions in the Nordic
labour markets, where trade unions and central bargaining play an
important role. The results regarding trade union density and depend-
ence support such a conclusion.
Our findings also point to the need to discuss the concept and mea-
surement of skill specificity. As indicated, the three measures of specific
skill point, to some extent, in different directions. Required on-the-job
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training is a direct measure of the need for skills acquired through prac-
tical training. In the VoC perspective, such training is more or less equat-
ed with firm-specific skill. However, skills acquired through on-the-job
training may differ in their portability. Here, our measures of depend-
ence and, to some extent, tenure can be used to assess this portability: we
find that firm-specific skills are most common in the Continental coun-
tries, where both average tenure and the level of on-the-job training are
high, and where a large proportion of employees report that they would
have problems finding an equal or better job with another employer. In
contrast, in the Liberal countries, skills appear to be much more portable,
as employees combine a high level of on-the-job training with low aver-
age tenure and a low level of dependence. In the Mediterranean countries,
employees receive little training and are highly dependent on their
employers.
These patterns indicate that further research is needed to deepen our
understanding of the association between training and employer–employee
dependence. Assumptions about this relationship are of central importance
in theories of on-the-job training and internal labour markets, as well as
in the debate about labour market flexibility; in fact, assumptions about
dependence constitute an important reason for discussing skill specificity
at all. Yet these assumptions have not been tested empirically. Thus, direct
measures of dependence can be used to further our understanding of the
consequences of skill investments, and their absence. Also, different fac-
tors that may affect the relationship between skill investments and
employer–employee dependence should be considered: not only labour
market institutions, such as unions, but also educational systems and
active labour market policies, which affect the possibilities for re-training
as well as the specificity of the acquired skills.
The results presented in this article also raise questions regarding the
idea of a trade-off between general and specific skills. Recent economic
research indicates that many skills are in fact transferable (OECD, 2003).
In our study, the positive correlation between class position and all three
measures of firm-specific skill suggests that the two can go hand in hand,
since class correlates positively with the level of general education.
In sum, we think it is important to include direct measures of training
in research on skill formation, capturing both school- and work-based
training and, if possible, both employers’ and employees’ perceptions.
However, to assess skill specificity, such measures must be combined
with indicators assessing the consequences of training. Important indica-
tors include measures of employer–employee dependence, and indicators
of actual mobility such as labour turnover. Tenure may also be used to
examine the consequences of skill investment, but as a measure of skill it
is far from ideal. Our study shows that it interacts in complicated ways
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with both individual and regime-level characteristics. Moreover, it corre-
lates weakly with the training and dependence measures.10
NOTES
1 Becker himself noted (1993: 49) that some training is useful neither in most
firms, nor in a single firm, but ‘in a set of firms defined by product, type of
work, or geographical location’. As with general training, however, Becker
assumed that firms would have little interest in investing in such training
since a single firm cannot readily collect the return.
2 A second measure used in the study is vocational training, but apart from
noting that apprenticeships and vocational schools are less common in
LMEs, the measure is not discussed.
3 In the VoC literature, the Continental countries have been described as sector-
coordinated and the Nordic countries as nationally coordinated, that is,
with peak-level bargaining and coordination between hierarchical organiza-
tions of business and labour (Crouch and Streeck, 1997; Kitschelt et al.,
1999; Soskice, 1999).
4 For information regarding data collection and response rates, see
[www.europeansocialsurvey.org.].
5 The strong relationships between different forms of dependence and wages
‘would appear to be especially convincing, given the hard qualities of the
wage data’ which contain very little error, when compared with information
from employer-based tax file registers (Tåhlin, 2004: 7).
6 ISCO-88 was recoded into a five-category EGP class schema (Erikson and
Goldthorpe, 1992).
7 Hierarchical logit notation is commonly used within the loglinear model-
ling framework and is a convenient way of presenting model specifications.
Hierarchical notation in this context means that lower-order terms embed-
ded within higher-order terms are not shown in the notation, but included
in the model. For example, a simple model notated as {Y*X*A}, includes
the following terms in the model {Y, X, A, Y*X, Y*A, Y*X*A, X*A}. The
‘logit’ indicates that the terms associated with the independent variables
only (in the above example, that is {X, A, X*A}) are calculated in the model
but not shown in the notation.
8 Note that age and workplace size are treated as continuous variables in the
MLA, as no additional valuable information was obtained by treating them
as categorical variables. However, in Table 1 results are reported for three
age groups (20–30; 40–50; 55–65) and workplace sizes 1 and 4 (1  25;
2  25–99; 3  100–500; 4  500).
9 Among those aged 65 (using the Liberal regime as reference category  0),
estimates from the MLA indicate a 9.3 unit increase in training in the
Nordic regime (10.180.30*65) and 1.3 unit increase in the Continental
regime (5.860.11*65). Among those aged 35, corresponding estimates
are 0.3 and 2.0.
10 Pearson’s r: tenure–training  0.18, tenure–dependence  0.08,
training–dependence  0.14.
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